In recent times, Indian banks have resorted to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the expectation to reap efficiency gains brought in by such strategies. This paper explores the impact of M&A on technical efficiency of Indian commercial banks during the second decade (2000-2010) of reforms. We use DEA to compute the relative technical efficiency of banks that participated in M&A activities. The technical efficiency is computed under both common and separate frontier with the assumption of constant as well as variable returns to scale. We also compare the postamalgamation efficiency scores of the participating banks with that of a control group comprising of such banks that did not undergo any consolidation since 1991. Our results indicate evidence of efficiency gains for the merging and/or acquiring banks. At the same time there are banks that have experienced deterioration in their post-M&A average efficiency levels. It would be wise for the banks to carefully consider the potential gains as well as threats posed by M&A before venturing into such activities.
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a means of modern corporate restructuring strategies have been increasingly resorted to in recent times to reap different forms of strategic benefits (viz. cost efficiencies, maximization of shareholders ' value, synergies, etc.) . Financial innovations have also fuelled consolidation activities. Commercial banks across the world have resorted to M&A in expectation to enhance efficiency gains through such consolidation strategies. In recent past, just after the massive sub-prime crisis when the world had witnessed a global financial meltdown that engulfed some of the giant advanced economies, there has been much emphasis on the efficiency of the commercial banks.
We focus on M&A that had taken place in the Indian commercial banking sector and the gamut of challenges and opportunities that such shake outs and restructuring brought in to the banks. In this context, a central issue has been whether M&A enhanced efficiency of the Indian commercial banks. The post-liberalization era of banking sector reforms had opened up fierce competition among inter and intra-bank groups in India. The cutthroat competition has resulted in new challenges especially for the public sector banks to hold back their market share, retention of the consumer base and creation of a new customer base.
The objective here is to explore the pre and post-M&A performance of Indian banks when there had been number of measures (e.g., interest rate deregulation, operational autonomy, etc.) that were taken towards the financial market reforms. The itinerary of the paper is as follows. Section 2 evaluates recent performance of the banks with respect to certain parameters. Section 3 discusses amalgamation among commercial banks and issues related to concentration in the banking sector. Section 4 mentions the extant empirical literature followed by discussion on research methodology, data and variables in Section 5. Empirical results are reported in Section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
Performance of Scheduled Commercial Banks
The banking sector in India is largely dominated by the public sector banks (PSBs) that account for nearly 70 percent of the banking assets.
i In particular, the commercial banks account for majority of the total assets of India's financial landscape which in turn is largely dominated by the scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). The fast pace of deposits growth can be viewed from the fact that over a year time (2009 to 2010) total bank deposits increased by 48.6 percent. Not only that, the total advances and investments made by the SCBs grew at an impressive rate of 16.5 percent and 18.6 percent respectively, during the same period. Latest available statistics reveal that the new private sector banks have registered the highest growth rate at 20.8 percent in the branch network during 2009-10 while SCBs as a whole marked 7 percent expansion in their total branch network during the same period. All commercial banks have migrated to Basel II framework for maintaining their regulatory capital. During the year 2010, the capital base of all SCBs increased by 16.9 percent over the previous year. ROA has been higher than the benchmark (1 percent) in 12 public sector and 14 private sector banks.
ii These figures portray that since the initiation of financial sector reforms in early 1990s, private and foreign banks have carved a niche for themselves in the Indian financial system. These banks also started setting new standard for the entire banking sector in terms of capital adequacy, return on capital and profit per employee, etc.
iii The World Economic Forum in its Financial Development Index (2008) credits the gradual reforms and prudential regulations for the reasonable stability of the Indian banking system. Table 1 quickly assess the performance of the different commercial bank groups at three different years -1991, representing the initiation of the reform process, 2002 after a decade of reform process and 2010 for the recent performance. iv The table reveals the dismal performance of all the different bank groups on the eve of the reforms; however, the private banks had an edge over others. Since 1991, profit per employee has consistently increased and cost-income ratio has shown a secular fall across all the bank groups. Note: The cost-income ratio is ratio of operating cost (non-interest expense) to net total income (total income minus interest expense). Table 1 .1 reveals that on the eve of liberalization programs, the ratio of unsecured advances to total advances (a proxy for loan quality) increased substantially for SBI (by 47.3 percent) and private sector banks (74.6 percent) while the associates of SBI and other nationalized banks reported a marginal decline. This highlights the increased level of risk faced by the Indian banks. Financial repression best describes the state of banking sector until the dawn of the era of liberal economic policies in India. The banking sector had remained shielded from foreign competition consequent of the various restrictive policies in place. An imminent need for improvement in efficiency of Indian banks was recognized and subsequently RBI started focusing its policies in pursuit of capital adequacy and profitability of the banks. The banking sector reforms were aimed at ushering efficiency and stability in Indian banking sector. In the pre-reform days, interest rate regulation had been a major hindrance to the development and efficient functioning of the banking sector. Competition among banks was virtually absent and the nationalized banks were to perform many 'social duties'. All these were at the cost of profitability of the banks and eventually led to cumulative rise in non-performing assets (NPA). In spite of a rapid increase in the bank deposits, the profitability was extremely low -the average ROA in the second half of 1980s was only about 0.15 percent. In 1992-93, the NPA of public sector banks stood at 24 percent of the total loan portfolio. By 1991, the Indian banking sector had become unprofitable, inefficient, and financially weak; Joshi et al. (2003) . Following the nationalization of banks in 1969, the primary objective was not of attaining efficiency but an increase in deposits and loans by way of branch expansion. The banking sector in the recent past has shown stability and resilience. vi Amidst the global financial conundrum, Indian banking system was able to withstand the shocks of the meltdown mainly due to its strengths, prudential regulations and timely interventions by the RBI. Table 3 shows that banks have been successful in cutting down their operational expenses since the initiation of the reform process. Both the bank groups experience a decrease in the cost of intermediation by around 38 percent vis-à-vis their 1991 position. While the PSBs took some time to adjust to the regulatory changes, the private banks were able to adapt quickly to the new business environment. In the recent past, the PSBs had maintained a lower intermediation cost than their private sector counterparts implying their relative cost advantage with respect to the domestic private banks. 
Mergers &Acquisitions Among Indian Banks
The M&A scenario in the last decade has been quite prominent as 15 bank mergers and/or acquisitions have taken place with at least one merger and/or acquisition every year. ix HDFC, ICICI and SBI with two acquisitions each, are the banks that seem to be keen on taking advantages of M&A friendly environment witnessed by the banking sector. It is worth mentioning that prior to 1999, M&A were resorted to only by the weak banks. During the second decade of reforms the banking sector witnessed consolidation even between financially healthy banks; e.g., acquisition of State Bank of Indore by SBI.
A larger number of M&A have been voluntary and market driven based on strategic considerations. The share of the public and the private sector banks (as surviving entities) in the total number of M&A are 7 and 8, respectively. The private sector banks had a larger share in the number of participating banks (acquirer plus target bank) than the PSBs. The decade of 2000-10 actually saw the re-emergence of consolidation in the banking system in a more pronounced way wherein a total of 17 M&A took place. A noteworthy feature of the first phase of financial sector reforms (1991-94) is the increased importance of consolidation strategies; for instance, the merger of New Bank of India with Punjab National Bank in 1993. There from, the Indian banking sector has witnessed a new series of merger & acquisition activities involving both the public sector and Indian owned private sector banks. In the public sector, SBI The prospects of M&A in the Indian banking sector can be seen from two perspectives. One is the legal or regulatory framework that have taken place since the herald of gradual liberalization during which the restrictions on such activities have been removed or moderated by the policy makers. The second perspective is to assess whether the merging banks have reaped any potential advantage from such consolidation strategies. To put it differently, there is an imperative to gauge the financial position of banks vis-à-vis M&A strategies.
Issues in Consolidation
During the first decade of reforms, Avkiran (1999) cautioned the policy makers against any haste in facilitating M&A activities as there are inconclusive international evidences of gains reaped either by the banks themselves or by their customers. The merging banks were expected to improve their financial performance so as to give healthy competition to the big foreign banks in near future. In cases where a strong bank is merged with a relatively weak bank, M&A should not result in post-merger dilution of the former bank's efficiency. The surviving banks should be able to transfer its managerial and other skills to the acquired units and maintain its pre-merger efficiency. Bagchi et al. (2005) argued that M&A should not be aimed at improving the balance sheet of the weak banks so as to make them attractive targets by foreign banks that are on acquisition spree. Consolidation should not have any adverse effect on credit access to the needy section and priority sectors of the society namely, agriculture and SMEs.
There are some differences in opinion about the prospect of consolidation in the Indian banking sector. On one hand, there is skepticism and doubts about the viability of M&A activities; and at the other end, there are potential gains to be reaped by resorting to M&A strategies. The extant literature reveals that the greater degree of stability achieved by the Indian commercial banks has been at the cost of efficiency. See, Das (1997) , Basu (2005) , Sensarma (2005) and Zhao et al. (2010) , among others.
Another important issue is the threat of concentration that such consolidation strategies bring along. We compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on total assets of the public and private sector banks to see if the level of concentration has increased, decreased or remained stable following the spate of M&A in the last decade. It can be said that over the past decade the Indian banking system has been fairly competitive. The consolidation process has not adversely affected the level of competition in Indian banking sector as the HHI shows a decline in the concentration during the second decade of reforms. The advent of new private sector banks has increased competition among the public and (domestic) private sector banks as indicated by the fall in the HHI score from 2001 to 2010. The increased competitive pressure is likely to affect the profit margin and the cost of intermediation of the banks.
A Brief Review of Literature
Most of the studies on banking sector of developing economies had addressed the efficiency aspects rather than assessing the impact of M&A. In the Indian context, very few studies have appraised the impact of consolidation strategies in the banking sector, though there is considerable literature on efficiency aspects. The literature review is divided here into two parts. The first part focuses on the efficiency issues of the SCBs and the possible bottlenecks that act as hindrances to the performance of Indian banks; and the second part discusses the evidence on M&A and efficiency gains that the Indian banking sector has so far witnessed.
Way back in the 1970s, Khusro et al. (1971) indicated that the banks with higher efficiency were also the banks with the higher annual growth rate. In the post-reforms period Bhattacharyya et al. 1997) found that while PSBs could attain higher (technical) efficiency, the private and foreign banks secured substantially low efficiency scores. Sathye (2003) found foreign banks to be relatively more efficient than their national counterparts in the usage of employees and deposits. The dismal performance of the private banks was referred to their expansionary phase with relatively higher amount of fixed assets employed. Rationalization of staff and branches were suggested to improve the efficiency of banks. Shanmugam et al. (2004) while analyzing the technical efficiency of SBI Groups, Nationalized Banks, Indian Private Banks and Foreign Banks during 1992 to 1999, indicated that significant difference between banks' potential and realized efficiency to stem from technical inefficiency. Chatterjee et al. (2006) while comparing the performance of commercial banks with respect to lending observed that the public sector commercial banks lagged behind the private sector commercial banks both in respect of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. According to Mahesh et al. (2008) Indian banks in the wake of financial liberalization were more efficient in generating deposits than making investments. An inspection of the major determinants of in(efficiency) identified bank size and competition as the two important factors. The PSBs were found to be more efficient. They suggested mergers to happen among the small banks as the bigger banks were found to be scale efficient. Kumar et al. (2009) observed majority of PSBs to improve their efficiency during the post-reform phase. The banks that were classified as inefficient during the initial years showed higher level of improvement in their efficiency vis-à-vis the banks that were efficient at the onset of reforms. Zhao et al. (ibid.) found that (cost) efficiency of Indian banks experienced a fall till 1996 and increased thereafter. While foreign banks were found to be efficient in the initial years of study, later PSBs emerged to be relatively more efficient vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts. In another recent study by Ray et al. (2010) , the high scores of cost efficiency indicated waste minimization and appropriate input mix chosen by the banks. The national banks were found to improve their profit efficiency over the years. SBI group consistently scored much higher relative to other groups by virtue of their exclusive access to most of the government businesses. The foreign banks however, had higher profit efficiency scores than the nationalized banks.
M&A in Banking Sector: Evidence from India Data
Here we briefly review the available studies that have examined the effect of consolidation activities on the Indian banks. We could find very few studies that have attempted to appraise the impact of M&A on the efficiency of the merged/acquired banks.
Ram Mohan (2005) examined the rationale for consolidation in the Indian public sector banks. Among other factors that induced consolidation, deregulation and financial distress were recognized as the major drivers of M&A in the banking sector of the emerging economies. The author argued that it was essentially due to removal of interest rate ceilings on savings deposits that put pressure on bank spreads that forced banks to see M&A as a timely opportunity to offset the impact of declining margins on their profitability. Diversification rather than economies of scale or scope was suggested to benefit the banks from mergers. Bagchi et al. (ibid.) argued that granting managements the autonomy to undertake domestic and foreign acquisitions would improve banks profitability but at the expense of small borrowers and economically backward regions of the country.
x The authors maintained that mergers among banks should be case based and ought to be judged by the business complementarities and synergies of the merging banks. M&A among the banks was intended to make the distressed banks financially sound so as to make them potential acquisition targets. Gourlay et al. (2006) argued that even if the merging banks could not realize the potential gains completely, they still might have got enough efficiency gains to have competitive advantage vis-à-vis the non-merging banks. The market driven mergers did not provide the merging banks with any competitive edge vis-à-vis the non-merging banks. RBI undertook a study in 2008. This study also involved seven select commercial bank mergers.
xi Although 21 cases of amalgamations had taken place since 1991, the central bank chose only those seven banks that were relatively larger in size to assess the impact of such consolidation activities on the efficiency of the banks. Out of the seven chosen banks, four were PSB while three were from the private sector. A significant improvement in the average ROA among the PSBs was observed. In terms of operational cost-assets ratio, three of the four PSBs reported a fall while private banks experienced an increase during the post-merger period. Kumar et al. (2010) found that the merging banks experienced a fall in their ROA in the post-merger period. Further, the ratio of fund-based income to cash flow also decreased in the aftermath of M&A. However, after the mergers, banks reported an increase in the ratios of loan to equity and deposit to equity. Kaur et al. (2010) analyzed eleven bank mergers of which in eight cases the surviving entity happened to be a PSB. The results indicated presence of significant difference between the pre and post-merger (cost) efficiency scores of the merged banks. The mergers in which the surviving banks happened to be PSBs were forced mergers. On the contrary, all the market driven mergers involved private banks as surviving entities. The mergers between strong and weak banks failed to translate efficiency gains for the surviving banks. The authors suggested mergers to be undertaken only between strong banks and not between strong and weak banks. Market driven mergers were found to be successful in improving the efficiency of the merging Indian banks.
Thus we find that some studies have reported efficiency gains in terms of technical, cost, scale or profit, for the merging banks. At the same time there are studies that have found no efficiency gains bestowed by M&A. There is no clear evidence in the literature of efficiency gains brought in by M&A. This motivated us to undertake this study.
Research Methodology
Traditionally finance ratios such as ROA, operating ratio and profitability have been used to measure the performance of commercial banks. However, often it is argued that gauging performance of the banks based on such ratios could be misleading as these ratios do not capture the long-term performance; see for instance Sherman et al. (1985) . In recent times, there is a growing trend to explain the performance of the banks using frontier analysis methods, namely DEA, SFA, among others. Of late, the usual practice is to use the profitability ratios as supplements to the efficiency scores to look for any significant disagreement in both the aforesaid approaches; Sathye (ibid.). Following the major studies in the existing literature, we use DEA to estimate efficiency of banks. Following Koopmans (1951) an input vector x is technically efficient for the production of an output quantity q if by reducing any component of x renders it unfeasible for producing q. xv In other words, an input vector x L (q) is said to be technically efficient for the production of q if there is no x′ L (q) with x′ ≤ x. The set of all input vectors that are technically efficient for the production of q are denoted by
Data Envelopment Analysis
Let there be N DMUs, then the objective of maximizing the technical efficiency of jth DMU can be written as: The above stated formulation yields output-oriented measure of technical efficiency.
We estimate output-oriented technical efficiency scores of the Indian commercial banks. The rationale for choosing this approach is that Indian commercial banks have moved on significantly from catering to the 'social duties' to profit maximizing corporate entities in the post-reform competitive world. This is worth mentioning here that in 1991 the SLR in India was 38.5% and CRR 15%. Presently, SLR is 24% and CRR below 5% (as of 1st week of June, 2012). With such measures from the RBI the commercial banks have sufficient funds at their disposal to be loaned out. As the survival of banks depends on their profit potential, commercial banks are on an aggressive loan and investment making spree. India being a fast growing economy and having a reasonably developed financial market, the commercial banks are faced with the challenge of providing the banking needs to the business houses and public in general. Efficiency of banks is reflected in the ability of the banks to transform its resources (mainly, deposits) to outputs (loans and advances). Thus, we feel that for Indian commercial banks output augmentation is of more importance than economizing on the usage of inputs. We consider the data period 2000-2010 for evaluating post-M&A efficiency of SCBs in India. In doing so, we consider the five-year average relative efficiency scores of commercial banks and compare the mean pre-M&A relative efficiency score with the post-M&A mean technical efficiency score. But unfortunately, we could not find relevant data for the year 2000.
Data and Variables
xix Furthermore, we encounter that for a few banks the figures pertaining to our choice of variables were not available for the year 1995. Hence, in order to compute the pre-M&A average relative efficiency scores of certain banks we extend our data period backwards to 1994. Data were not available for all the banks for all the years due to non-reporting by some of the banks. Therefore, the number of banks in the study has varied over the years due to entry of some new banks in the private as well as public sector, M&A among the banks apart from non-availability of data for certain variables for some years. See Table 7 .
In the literature, three approaches have been mentioned with respect to modelling the behavior of banks. The first is the production approach that treats banks as any other production unit. The second is intermediation approach proposed by Sealey et al. (1977) . The intermediation approach differs from the production approach as it allows deposits to be treated as an input. Berger et al. (1997) suggest that intermediation approach is most appropriate for assessing bank level efficiency while the production approach is best suited for analyzing branch level efficiency. The third one is modern approach; see Denizer et al. (2007) for more details. In the literature intermediation approach has been preferred to model bank behavior. It is essentially because it allows interest expenses that comprise a substantial part of banks' total costs to be used as an input. Moreover it is difficult to get data in terms of number of accounts serviced as required by the production approach. One more drawback of the production approach is that the number of accounts serviced by a bank does not truly reflect the average size of deposits and the associated costs of servicing those accounts; see Gilligan et al. (1984) . Following Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) , Avkiran (ibid.), Casu et al. (2002) , Sathye (ibid.) and Kumar et al. (2009) , among others we model the behavior of the Indian commercial banks with intermediation approach.
Advances and interest income are the two outputs considered while total deposits and establishment expenses are the two inputs used. In the context of Indian commercial banks, establishment expenses refer to the expenditure incurred on payments to and provisions for the employees. Table 7 reports the total number of banks included in the computation of the efficiency frontier. The number of PSBs has remained stable over the years whereas the number of domestic private banks changed due to entry of new banks and also due to M&A activities. 
Empirical Results
In order to assess the impact of M&A on the surviving bank, we compare the five-year average relative efficiency scores before and after the merger and/or takeover. There were a total of 15 M&A among the public and domestic private sector banks in India during the period 2000-2010. Very recently there have been 2 M&A -one between ICICI Bank and Bank of Rajasthan and the other between SBI and State Bank of Indore both took place in the year 2010. Hence, we excluded them from our study as their post-amalgamation assessment is not possible. There are a few cases where one bank has engaged itself into M&A activity more than once in different time periods ⎯ for instance, HDFC Bank and ICICI Bank. Whether HDFC has taken over another bank or any bank has merged with HDFC we treat such a newly formed unit as a bank itself.
We compute the efficiency of the banks under both common and separate frontier. The common frontier refers to inclusion of both the PSBs and the private banks in estimation of the frontier and the relative efficiency of a bank is calculated relative to the common frontier. In the separate frontier banks of only one group are included at a time in the estimation of the frontier and the relative efficiency of a bank is calculated relative to the efficiency of the banks on the efficiency frontier. Coelli et al. (2005) stated that the CRS assumption is appropriate if all the DMUs are operating at an optimal scale. If a DMU operates at sub-optimal scale then estimation of TE produces results that incorporate scale effects. Banker et al. (ibid.) efficiency of a DMU is compared to DMUs of similar sizes. A difference between TE scores obtained from CRS and VRS assumption indicates scale inefficiency of the DMUs. We have estimated efficiency of banks under both these assumptions to check for scale inefficiency of the banks.
We judge the success of an M&A based on the following criteria: (i) The merging and/or acquiring bank is able to improve its efficiency in the post-M&A period vis-à-vis the pre-merger period; and
(ii) The concerned bank's post-M&A efficiency is higher than that of a defined control group.
Common Frontier with CRS
We begin with output-oriented relative TE of the commercial banks with respect to the common frontier. Initially we assume that the banks operate under CRS, though we relax this assumption later to explore for any inconsistency in the results also to examine for any possible scale inefficiency. Table 8 .1 reports the pre and post-amalgamation average relative TE of the 13 M&A cases. We find that in 8 of the 13 cases efficiency has improved after the consolidation. A close examination of the cases reveals that all the 5 cases where TE did not improve after M&A were before the year 2005. In the later part of the decade banks had become more efficient in their usage of mobilizing deposits towards advances.
Out of the 5 unsuccessful M&A, 3 involved acquisition of a private bank by a PSB suggesting that difference in the operational environment between the two bank groups could have affected the post-merger performance of the PSBs. Further, in 9 of the 13 cases, the acquiring banks were more technically efficient vis-à-vis the acquired banks. M&A helped two banks namely IDBI and ICICI Bank that were earlier close to the efficiency frontier in their pre-merger years to become frontier banks post-merger. Most of the banks are found to have average relative TE scores lie below 1 both in the pre and post-M&A years. 
Common Frontier with VRS
We now report (Table 8. 2) the output-oriented pre and post-M&A average relative TE with the relaxed assumption that all the banks may not be operating at their optimal scale. Only 6 banks (against 8 banks under CRS) benefitted from M&A; 2 banks, namely ICICI and HDFC maintained their pre-merger TE score in the post-merger period as well. All banks secure efficiency scores higher than those obtained under CRS. It is because under the VRS assumption, DEA compares a bank with an efficient bank of similar size. The difference in the TE score 
Separate Frontier with CRS
The business environment of the PSBs and private banks is arguably different due to difference in technology, operational flexibility among other factors. This prompted us to compute the efficiency scores of the banks under separate frontiers. The efficiency frontier of the former includes only the public sector banks while that of the latter includes only the private banks. It We find that the scores of most of the banks increased under the separate frontier relative to those obtained under the common frontier. Only 6 banks witnessed improvement in post-amalgamation efficiency scores compared to 8 under the common frontier. IDBI, Federal Bank (FB), ICICI and IOB witnessed post-M&A increase whereas HDFC and PNB witnessed fall in TE. ICICI is the only common bank to report post-amalgamation increase in efficiency scores. Similarly HDFC and PNB are the ones to experience decline in their relative mean efficiency scores. 
Separate Frontier with VRS
We find that ICICI, IDBI, and SBI witness an increase in their post-M&A efficiency level whereas HDFC, PNB and FB report a decline in both the efficiency aspects. FB, CBP and HDFC that had experienced improvement in TE (post-M&A under the common frontier), now witness decline in their efficiency level. We find that for HDFC and PNB, post-amalgamation efficiency decline under both common frontier with both CRS and VRS assumptions. 
Comparison with the Control Group
In this section we assess the extent to which M&A were able to benefit the merging banks relative to their non-merging counterparts. It is possible that M&A might not have benefitted banks in terms of efficiency enhancement in the post-M&A vis-à-vis their pre-M&A efficiency levels but still it could have enabled the bank to gain competitive advantage relative to those banks that did not opt to expand via the inorganic routes. To perform the analysis we construct a control group consisting of such banks that did not participate in any M&A activity for fifteen years before the year of post-M&A comparison. The post-M&A average efficiency (five years after the M&A) of a merged bank was compared to the average efficiency of the control group (CG). For example, the first M&A took place in 2000 -we compare the average efficiency of the bank five years after its M&A with the average efficiency of the control group in 2005. The control group constructed for the year 2005 consists of such banks that did not participate in any M&A since 1990. Similarly, the control group constructed for the year 2006 comprises of such banks that did not participate in any M&A since 1991 and so on. The composition of the control group varied over the years due to two reasons; one because of entry and exit of banks in the banking system; second due to imposition/lapse of the constraint on the banks pertaining to participation in M&A activity.
It may be recalled that success of a M&A is measured subject to two criteria -bank's post-M&A TE is greater than its pre-M&A TE; bank's post-M&A TE exceeds that of a defined control group. If a surviving bank fulfills both the criteria, we term the M&A as successful one, if it fulfills any one of the two criteria we call it as partial successful and if it fails in both, we call it as an unsuccessful M&A.
The M&A Matrix
In the above matrix, Quadrant I denotes M&A that achieve the dual success of improving the post-M&A TE of the surviving banks and also gives it competitive advantage over its nonmerging counterparts. Those M&As that fail to improve the post-M&A efficiency of the surviving banks but increase the banks efficiency relative to the non-merging banks lie in the Quadrant II. Such M&As that failed to improve the post-M&A efficiency relative to both the pre-M&A When the assumption of CRS was changed to VRS, we found 7 banks to improve their post-M&A mean technical efficiency. Under the separate frontier with CRS, 6 banks witnessed improvement in post-M&A TE; whereas under the relaxed assumption of VRS, 5 banks improved their post-M&A technical efficiency.
We also judged the success of an amalgamation also with respect to a defined dynamic control group consisting of non-merging banks. We found 4 banks to be successful and 8 to be partially successful. Bank of Baroda, Oriental Bank of Commerce and Centurion Bank of Punjab are the three banks that had unsuccessful amalgamation whereas IDBI, ICICI and SBI witnessed success mostly.
However, not all banks are able to benefit from consolidation. M&A among the banks should be case specific and based on the potential synergy gains and the associated threats for the merging banks.
It is yet to be ascertained a priori if M&A are the best ways to consolidate before preferring it over other ways of restructuring. In addition, the M&A environment in the Indian commercial banking sector should not culminate in market concentration. The evidence till now does not indicate an increase in market concentration as along with the exit of several banks due to consolidation, 12 new banks were set up in the past two decades.
Availability of data pertaining to our choice of variables for the banks that underwent consolidation during the period 1991-1999 would have enabled us to enlarge the sample size and hence a more conclusive set of results could have been obtained. Also, we could not segregate the impact of successive M&A activities on efficiency of a bank. Banker et al. (1984) extended the original CCR model to make it applicable to technologies characterized by variable returns to scale. xiii There is another variant of the DEA model developed by Bogetoft et al. (2005) . xiv If a firm is operating under CRS, then the average productivity of the firm at two different points on the production frontier would be the same. xv Conventionally, efficiency of a firm is reflected by its success in producing maximum possible output from a given vector of inputs; see Farell (1957) , Ray (2004) , among others. Alternatively, Ramanathan (2003) defines technical efficiency of a firm as the ratio of output to input. xvi IBA annually publishes various reports on the Indian Banking sector that contain useful information on a wide range of variables such capital adequacy, advances, deposits, etc. Some other reports are, Indian Banking at a Glance, Consolidation in the Indian Banking Sector among others. xvii Foreign banks as a whole had just 310 offices in the country during 2009-10 compared to 43,187 and 10,387 offices of nationalized and Indian owned private sector banks respectively. Their share in the total deposits, total advances and total investments during 2009-10 stood at 5 percent, 4.6 percent and 9.26 percent respectively; see A Profile of Banks, RBI (2009-10 
